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STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The only issue properly raised by this appeal is whether
plaintiffs-appellants commenced this medical malpractice action
against defendant-respondent Dr. David W. Brown within two
years of the time they discovered, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, that Mrs. Brower had
sustained an injury allegedly resulting from her care and
treatment by Dr. David W. Brown.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4,

(1953, as amended).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action for medical malpractice brought by plaintiffs-appellants Saundra Brower and Frank Oscar Brower (hereinafter "Browers") against Dr. David W. Brown arising out of
injuries allegedly sustained in connection with a hysterectomy
operation (excising the uterus) performed by Dr. Brown on
plaintiff Saundra Brower on October 22, 1980, at the Valley
View Medical Center in Cedar City, Utah.
Dr. Brown moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on the basis that the
Browers' claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations contained in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, Utah
Code Ann. § 78-14-4 (1953, as amended), requiring that such
actions be commenced within two years of the time a patient
discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should
have discovered the injury.

Following the submission of legal

memoranda and oral argument, the District Court, the Honorable
Allen B. Sorensen presiding, granted Dr. Brown's motion and
entered summary judgment in his behalf by order dated January
4, 1985.

The Browers now appeal from that summary judgment.

The District Court also granted summary judgment for defendant-respondent I.H.C. Hospitals, Inc., dba Valley View Medical
Center and denied the Browers' motion for partial summary judgment to the effect that their cause of action was not barred by
the statute of limitations.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Dr. Brown incorporates herein by this reference the Statement of Facts contained in the Brief of Respondent Valley View
Medical Center with respect to Saundra Brower1s leg injury and
provides the following supplementation of facts which apply to
the other aspects of the plaintiffs1 claims against Dr. Brown.
Saundra Brower first began experiencing irregular menstruation and related problems at the comparatively early age of 17
or 18 and was first diagnosed as having endometriosis (a condition in which tissue more or less perfectly resembling the
uterine mucous membrane occurs aberrantly in various locations
in the pelvic cavity) in 1971 by Dr. Stephen Clark in Buena
Park, California.
pp. 20-21).

(R. 153, Deposition of Saundra Brower,

Dr. Clark performed a uterine suspension which

temporarily resolved Mrs. Brower*s problems for a period of
approximately two years, but in 1973 she saw Dr. Clark again
for the same type of symptoms, which included irregular menstrual cycles with bleeding, cramping, nausea and "knifestabbing pains in the groin area."

Dr. Clark suggested that

she go back on birth control pills to attempt to control these
symptoms, but Mrs. Brower wanted to become pregnant at that
time and as an alternative, he prescribed a fertility drug.
(Dep. of Saundra Brower, pp. 21-28).

-3-

When the same symptoms
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continued without relief, Dr. Clark advised Mrs. Brower that if
she were older, he would recommend a hysterectomy.

(Dep. of

Saundra Brower, p. 29).
After moving with her family to Kanab, Utah, in approximately 1974, Mrs. Brower was under the care of Dr. Howard
Roberts for the same type of symptoms and he also prescribed
the use of birth control pills, but she still wanted to become
pregnant and therefore did not want to go on birth control
pills.

In addition, birth control pills had not previously

given her any relief from these symptoms.

(Dep. of Saundra

Brower, p. 30).
Saundra Brower went to see Dr. Brown on the recommendation
of her sister, Marsha Eddy, because she had previously been
told that the only relief for the symptoms she was experiencing
would be to have a hysterectomy performed and "I had decided to
have a hysterectomy."

She had been given that advice by both

Dr. Clark and Dr. Roberts.

(Dep. of Saundra Brower, p. 32).

At the time Saundra Brower first consulted with Dr. Brown in
i

his office on October 14, 1980, she had already made the determination that she wanted to have a hysterectomy performed; and
following examination and consultation, arrangements were made
at that time to schedule the surgery.

(Dep. of Saundra Brower,

pp. 32-33, 37-38).
i

-4-
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The gravamen of the plaintiffs1 claims as against Dr. Brown
relate to the hysterectomy itself, which was performed at
Valley View Medical Center on October 22, 1980, as well as to
his care and treatment prior to and following that surgery.
(R. 1 Complaint, 1f 11-12).
Within a couple of weeks of the surgery, Saundra Brower
began experiencing hot flashes and rawness in the vaginal area
which were completely new symptoms and different than any she
had experienced before.

(Dep. of Saundra Brower, p. 60).

Neither Dr. Brown nor anyone else she had consulted had advised
her that she might expect to experience such hot flashes and
rawness in the vaginal area following a hysterectomy.

(Dep. of

Saundra Brower, p. 71). Prior to undergoing surgery, it was
Saundra Brower1s understanding that her problems would be completely resolved shortly after the operation and that she would
have an "immediate-type of recovery."

(Dep. of Saundra Brower,

pp. 70, 84). The last time that Mrs. Brower saw or spoke with
Dr. Brown was within approximately one month of the hysterectomy, on or about November 25, 1980, following the administration of a hormone injection and the prescription of vaginal
cream, at which time he told her that there was "nothing more
he could do for me."

(Dep. of Saundra Brower, pp. 61-64; R.

151 Dep. of Dr. David W. Brown, Exh. 1).

-5-
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A Notice of Intent to Commence Legal Action was served on
Dr. Brown on or about February 16, 1983, and the complaint in
this action was filed on June 14, 1983.

(Complaint, 1f 8).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The undisputed facts, as demonstrated by the allegations of
the complaint and the uncontradicted testimony of Mrs. Brower,
establish that more than two years elapsed from the date that
the Browers discovered or should have discovered both the fact
of her injury and the possibility that it may have been caused
by negligence on the part of Dr. Brown.

Neither the specific

advice of a health care professional nor certainty of causation
and negligence is required before a plaintiff may be charged
with the knowledge that she has suffered a legal injury so that
the two-year statute of limitations begins to run.

Mrs. Brower

knew, or should have known, of the existence of a possible
cause of action against Dr. Brown as of her final contact with
him on November 25, 1980, at the very latest.

The service of

the Notice of Intent to Commence Action on February 16, 1983
and the filing of the plaintiffs' Complaint on June 14, 1983
are beyond that two-year period and represent a failure on the
part of the Browers to assert their claims in a timely manner,
and this cause of action is therefore barred.
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Furthermore, no allegations have been made, nor would the
undisputed facts support, the conclusion that Dr. Brown has
affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal the alleged misconduct so as to extend the statute of limitations.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT
THE BROWERS HAD FAILED TO COMMENCE THIS
ACTION WITHIN TWO YEARS AFTER THEY DISCOVERED, OR THROUGH THE USE OF REASONABLE
DILIGENCE SHOULD HAVE DISCOVERED, THEIR
LEGAL INJURY ATTRIBUTED TO THE CARE AND
TREATMENT RENDERED BY DR. BROWN.
A.

The Browers Knew Or Should Have Known Of The Injury To
Mrs. Brower's Leg On October 22, 1980, And Of The
Possibility That Injury May Have Been Caused By The
Negligence Of Dr. Brown.

In the interest of brevity, Dr. Brown incorporates the
argument with respect to Mrs. Brower's leg injury contained in
the brief of respondent Valley View Medical Center.

The focus

of that inquiry is clearly undisputed testimony from
Mrs. Brower that on the day of the operation she knew that
there was a problem and that something had happened that was
improper.

(Dep. of Saundra Brower, pp. 120-121).

The Browers make the bald allegation that there was active
concealment of the negligence of the defendants which resulted
in the tolling of the two year statute of limitations under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(l)(b) (1953, as amended), but the complaint simply contains the conclusory allegation in 1f 21 that

-7-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Dr. Brown wrongfully concealed from plaintiffs his careless and
negligent acts.

The sole piece of evidence that even peripher-

ally relates to this claim is the testimony of Saundra Brower
that while she was still in the hospital shortly following surgery , she asked Dr. Brown what happened to her leg and he
replied "I don't know, but I'll find out."

(Dep. of Saundra

Brower, p. 51).
That conversation occurred after Mrs. Brower had been
advised by the anesthesiologist that the leg injury did not
occur in the operating room, but following the conclusion of
surgery in the recovery room.
pp. 50-51).

(Dep. of Saundra Brower,

The suggestion that the failure to followup on a

request for information from a patient on a matter as to which
the individual physician has no apparent knowledge or involvement somehow amounts to active or fraudulent concealment is
totally without merit, either legally or factually.
In their brief, the Browers assert that Mrs. Brower was
somehow mislead by Dr. Brown's statement into thinking this was
a routine situation following her type of surgery and hospitalization but that proposition flies squarely in the face of her
undisputed testimony that she clearly knew this problem was
totally unrelated to the surgery and that something improper
had happened.
I

-8-
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As one court faced with a similar issue has stated:
A defendant's misrepresentations do not delay the
running of the statute of limitations if the plaintiff
knew or should have known that she had a cause of
action despite the representations.
Duncan v. Auqter, 661 P.2d 83, 87 (Or. App. 1983).
B,

Based On Her Prior Medical History And Understanding
Prior To The Surgical Hysterectomy, Mrs. Brower Knew
Or Should Have Known As Of November 25, 1980, The Last
Day On Which She Had Contact With Dr. Brown, That She
Had Sustained A Legal Injury Relating To The Hysterectomy Itself Or His Care And Treatment Before And After
The Surgery.

The Utah Health Care Malpractice Act provides that a malpractice action against a health care provider is barred
"unless it is commenced within two years after the plaintiff or
patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence
should have discovered the injury, whichever first occurs
. . ." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 (1953, amended).

This court

has previously interpreted that provision to mean that the
limitations period begins to run when an injured person knows
or should know that she has suffered a "legal injury."
Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144, 147 (Utah 1979).

Foil v.

In that decision,

the court further held that discovery of "injury" as used in
the applicable statute entails both discovery of the physical
injury and the possibility that the injury may have been caused
by negligence on the part of the health care provider. Id. at
148; See also Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 1982).

-9-
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While Mrs. Brower's testimony regarding her previous medical history may not be directly relevant to the allegations of
malpractice against Dr. Brown, it provides valuable insight as
to her knowledge and level of understanding regarding her own
medical condition.

Such facts are also significant when viewed

in light of the unanticipated difficulties she encountered following surgery which were also substantially different from any
symptoms she had previously experienced.
The affidavit of Saundra Brower, in which she states what
amounts to a self-serving legal conclusion that she did not
discover the negligence of the defendants or that she had sustained a legal injury until July of 1981, is contradictory to
her deposition testimony and fails to raise any material issues
of fact.

When faced with a similar "declaration of belief* in

Reiser v. Lohner, supra at 100, this court stated:
Mr. Reiser filed an affidavit wherein he asserted a
belief that his wife's disorders were temporary and
that he did not become aware of any permanent damage
until June, 1972. Such declaration of his belief was
not sufficient to raise an issue of fact. Furthermore, the very acknowledgement that his wife was suffering disorders as a result of the incident (whether
temporary or permanent) would show that plaintiffs
should have known that they suffered legal injury at
the time of the cardiac arrest. (Emphasis in original. )
The only logical and objective conclusion to be drawn from
the undisputed facts in this case is that the Browers were
similarly situated so as to be aware of "disorders" which
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should have lead even an untutored layman to the conclusion
that there might possibly be a connection between those
problems and the treatment of Dr. Brown.
The Browers ask this court to adopt a standard which would
essentially require that a plaintiff have the equivalent of
expert testimony as to the applicable standard of care, the
violation of that standard, and whether it resulted in damage
to the plaintiff before the two year period of the statute of
limitations could begin to run.

While such expert testimony is

clearly required at trial, it was never intended to be the kind
of practical inquiry contemplated in determining whether one
knew or should have known of the existence of an injury so as
to trigger the running of the statute of limitations.
The practical nature of this threshold inquiry was aptly
stated in Duncan v. Augter, supra, at 86:
To start the running of the statute of limitations, a
plaintiff need not have knowledge of facts that, if
proved, would convince every reasonable factfinder
that plaintiff should win. It is sufficient that a
plaintiff have knowledge, actual or implied, of facts
that, if proved, will at least raise an issue of fact
on each element of the claim. Therefore, a plaintiff
has discovered a cause of action and [the statute of
limitations] begins to run when he knows, or should
know through diligent inquiry, facts from which a
reasonable factfinder could conclude that the plaintiff's injury was caused by an act of the defendant
that was somehow negligent.
By the date of her last contact with Dr. Brown, as of
November 25, 1980, Mrs. Brower had full knowledge that she was

-11-
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experiencing difficulties clearly associated with the surgical
procedure Dr. Brown had performed and which were totally
unanticipated and different from any symptoms she had previously encountered.

Dr. Brown had advised her that there was

nothing more he could do for her.

As a result, by that date at

the latest, she knew or should have known facts from which a
reasonable person arguably could find that her "injuries," as
encompassing both the leg wound and the unanticipated complications following surgery which she has described, may have been
somehow related to the treatment of Dr. Brown.
Therefore, the filing of the notice of the intent to commence action on February 16, 1983, and the filing of the plaintiff's complaint on June 14, 1983, were beyond the period of
time allowed by the applicable statute of limitations and are
barred.
CONCLUSION
Both the language of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act
and the prior holdings of this court support the District
Court's determination that the undisputed facts in this case
establish that the Browers had knowledge or should have known
more than two years prior to the time their action was commenced that they had suffered an injury which may have been the
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result of negligence on the part of Dr. Brown.

The judgement

of the lower court to that effect should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / v ^ d a y of October, 1985.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By
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Attorneys xor DefendantRespondent Dr. David W. Brown
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Pursuant to Rule 26(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
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that on the 14th day of October, 1985, he caused four copies
of the Brief of Respondent to be served on counsel for each
party, addressed as follows:
Charles W. Dahlquist, II
Norman J. Younker
Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell
330 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Russell A. Cannon
Cannon & Wilkinson
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Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Dated this day of

(Attorneys for DefendantRespondent I.H.C. Hospitals,
Inc., a corporation and
I.H.C. Hospitals, Inc., a
corporation doing business
as Valley View Medical Center.)
(Attorneys for PlaintiffsAppellants Saundra Brower
and Frank Oscar Brower)
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